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Purpose: While corporations may embrace the concepts of social and environmental 
responsibility, numerous examples exist to show corporations claiming to act 
sustainably and responsibly, while simultaneously showing disregard for the 
communities in which they operate and causing considerable environmental damage. 
This chapter argues that such activities illustrate a particular notion of Baumol’s 
(1990) criminal entrepreneurialism where both creative and constructive compliance 
combine to subvert environmental regulation and its enforcement.   
Design/methodology/approach: This chapter employs a case study approach 
assessing the current corporate environmental responsibility landscape against the 
reality of corporate environmental offending. Its case study shows seemingly repeated 
environmental offending by Shell Oil against a backdrop of the company claiming to 
have integrated environmental monitoring and scrutiny into its operating procedures. 
Findings: The chapter concludes that corporate assertion of environmental credentials 
is itself often a form of criminal entrepreneurship where corporations embrace 
voluntary codes of practice and self-regulation while internally promoting the drive 
for success and profitability and/or avoidance of the costs of true environmental 
compliance deemed too high.   As a result this chapter argues that responsibility for 
environmental damage requires regulation to ensure corporate responsibility for 
environmental damage.   
Originality/value: The chapter employs a green criminological perspective to its 
analysis of corporate social responsibility and entrepreneurship.  Thus it considers not 
just strict legal definitions of crime and criminal behaviour but also the overlap 
between the legal and the illegal and the preference of Governments to use 
administrative or civil penalties as tools to deal with corporate environmental 
offending.     
Keywords – CSR/CER – environmental crime – pollution – ethical standards – 
social justice – Polluter pays 
Category – Viewpoint/Case Study 
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INTRODUCTION 
Baumol identifies a distinction between productive corporate innovation and 
unproductive activities such as organized crime (1990: 893).  However, within 
corporate environmental crime discourse, this distinction is not absolute.  Corporate 
compliance with environmental regulations operates along a continuum from absolute 
compliance to total non-compliance consistent with Hobsbawm’s view that private 
enterprise has a bias only towards profit (1969: 40).  Accordingly, non-compliance 
with environmental regulations and entrepreneurship which actively subverts or 
minimizes the costly impact of regulatory compliance can represent a form of 
innovation.  Corporations exploit business opportunities cognisant with the goal of 
maximising profit. Embracing green credentials, reassuring consumers and 
governments that they take their social and environmental responsibilities seriously 
are legitimate means through which corporations demonstrate alertness to 
opportunity, creativity and respond to consumer demand for ethical corporate 
practice.  
Yet while many corporations may embrace the concepts of social and 
environmental responsibility there are numerous examples of corporations who claim 
to act in a sustainable and responsible way, while at the same time showing disregard 
for the communities in which they operate and causing considerable environmental 
damage. Green criminology identifies that corporate environmental crimes are 
widespread and ‘often eclipse the scope and reach of the criminal law’ (Sollund, 
2012: 3). The global operations of Multi National (business) Entities (MNEs) can 
have significant negative consequences for the communities in which they operate and 
the wider environment yet are often legal given the relative lack of regulation for 
corporate practice in relation to environmental harm (White & Heckenberg, 2014).  
While business’ may in principle embrace the concept of ethical operations and 
human rights compliance claiming to implement these in their Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) policies, the extent to which they do so, the content of these 
policies and their applicability to the concept of environmental compliance varies 
considerably. There has been widespread adoption of CSR policies by businesses in 
developed countries in the last 20 years, yet business activities are often not subject to 
international law or human rights norms.  As a result CSR is largely voluntary and 
while CSR and Corporate Environmental Responsibility (CER) are routinely 
embraced by business, the question remains as to what extent this is just business 
proclaiming what people expect it to do while at the same time continuing to act either 
unethically or unlawfully. In some cases CSR becomes integrated into public relations 
(PR) discourse solely to downplay the harm caused by business practices. 
This chapter argues that such activities illustrate a particular notion of Baumol’s 
(1990) criminal entrepreneurialism where both creative and constructive compliance 
combine to subvert environmental regulation and its enforcement.  Corporations 
armed with the knowledge of a weak environmental regulatory regime (both 
nationally and internationally) and the preference of Governments to use 
administrative or civil penalties as tools to deal with corporate environmental 
offending embed non-compliance into their operating practices.  In doing so some 
corporations actively embrace the tools of corporate environmental responsibility, 
auditing and monitoring as structural mechanisms through which corporate offending 
can be neutralised (Sykes & Matza 1957).  They achieve this by blaming ‘rogue’ 
individuals within the company, law enforcement and even environmental victims 
themselves.   
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This chapter argues that corporate assertion of environmental credentials is itself often 
a form of criminal entrepreneurship where corporations embrace voluntary codes of 
practice and self-regulation while internally promoting the drive for success and 
profitability and/or avoidance of the costs of true environmental compliance deemed 
too high.  The chapter first examines the nature of corporate environmental 
responsibility, including its core principles and the underlying ethos behind ethical 
corporate environmental practices.  Secondly, the chapter defines corporate 
environmental responsibility and environmental damage, before considering the 
voluntary nature of most corporate environmental responsibility activity and the 
impact a relative lack of regulation has over corporate compliance with environmental 
regulation.  Finally this issue is explicitly explored within this chapter by a case study 
which assesses the current corporate environmental responsibility landscape against 
the reality of corporate environmental offending.   
Obschonka, Andersson, Silbereisen and Sverke (2013) identify entrepreneurs as 
individuals with a propensity for action, risk-taking and a desire to push against 
traditional structures and rules.  Scholarship on green entrepreneurism also alludes to 
the importance of ‘creative destruction’ where entrepreneurs promote change in part 
by challenging old ways of operating (Farinelli et al. 2011: 43).  Thus a notion of non-
compliance and testing the boundaries of structures can be incorporated into the 
accepted behaviours of entrepreneurs and should be considered within broad 
understandings of what constitutes the ‘criminal’ entrepreneur. The case study 
illustrates repeated corporate offending against a backdrop of apparent environmental 
monitoring and scrutiny of corporate environmental practices. The chapter thus 
explores a context in which corporations might repeatedly be the subject of regulatory 
enforcement action, yet continue to embed non-compliance into operating practices 
with fines being simply the cost of doing business.  Accordingly this chapter queries 
whether Baumol’s legal/illegal distinction remains valid in relation to corporate 
environmental offending.  In doing so it asks whether responsibility for environmental 
damage is both a corporate and social responsibility taking into account the nature of 
‘illegal’ actions by legal actors, and argues that it should be the subject of regulation 
to ensure corporate responsibility for environmental damage.   
 
THE NATURE OF CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY 
Corporate Social Responsibility1 policies can be integrated into a business model that 
theoretically provides for adherence to the law, ethical standards and international 
norms of business behaviour and accountability. CSR provides a means for 
corporations to promote their brand as ethically and socially responsible and operates 
mainly on the basis of self-regulation, where corporations are trusted to voluntarily 
adhere to non-legally binding standards of ethical behaviour, with no single 
commonly accepted definition of the principle (Mazurkiewicz, 2002). Generally 
‘every corporation has a policy concerning CSR and produces an annual report 
detailing its activity’ (Crowther & Aras, 2008:10), yet the central problem in 
assessing appropriate standards of CER is that a range of approaches to CER (within 
the broad CSR framework) exist and thus the effectiveness of CER and the extent to 
which corporations integrate CER into their practices as a tool to minimise 
environmental harm varies.  
                                               
1
 From this point on, the abbreviation CSR will be used when referring to general Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) or sustainability policies and reporting while the abbreviation CER will be used 
when referring to specific environmental responsibilities and Corporate Environmental Responsibility 
reporting. 
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Many major corporations such as Shell, BP etc. have good CER policies on paper 
but continue to commit environmentally damaging (and sometimes criminal) acts 
albeit sometimes unwittingly. Thus the issues for green criminology to consider in 
examining criminal entrepreneurship are how should good standards of CER be 
enforced? Assessing this requires considering whether this solely consists of defining 
what is legal or illegal or requires going further to include regulated standards of 
behaviour and expectations of corporate behaviour that the public will accept as 
ethical compliance. Harris (2011) highlights that corporations may adopt CSR/CER 
for a variety of reasons, principally: 
 
1. Acting ethically is the right way for the company to behave 
2. Doing what is right and fair is expected of an organisation 
3. Acting ethically is in the organisation’s best interests. 
(Harris, 2011:39) 
 
The extent to which one (or all) of these reasons applies and provides the 
corporation’s motivation for integrating CER can have an effect on whether CER is 
adopted as part of operational practices.  This influences corporate consideration of 
the impact and wider implications of its activities, or whether CER becomes solely an 
aspect of marketing and brand management, or simply a PR tool.  The need to combat 
negative publicity or damaging perceptions of a corporation and its valuable brand 
may, for example, lead to the adoption of CER purely to obtain benefits for a MNE’s 
public image. There may even be inconsistency within a MNE about the extent to 
which CER should be observed or apply to its operations, especially where there is no 
clear chain of CER ownership at board (strategic) level and CER reporting is outside 
of core corporate governance, external scrutiny or stakeholder audit.   
Thus, while some MNEs may engage with CER as an integral part of their 
corporate practices and regulatory auditing, others may only superficially engage with 
CER.  An organisation’s reporting of environmental compliance and its adoption of 
CER strategies are immaterial if the strategies are not adhered to in practice and make 
no impact on decision-making.  The validity of CER policies can also be questioned if 
CER is in conflict with operational practices that prioritize profit over environmental 
law compliance whether overtly or by implication. McBarnet argues that one 
approach to legal compliance is creative compliance where ‘practices that might be 
illegal, indeed criminal, if legally structured in one way could be legally repackaged 
and claimed to be lawful’ (2006: 1091).  Alternatively, active embracing of 
monitoring and auditing process can provide a means through which the appearance 
of compliance is achieved.   
CER adoption may therefore suit the needs of a corporation’s stakeholders or the 
development and protection of its brand, rather than being adopted as part of an 
ethical operating strategy that minimises the impact on communities affected by their 
actions.  However it may fail as a practical tool to encourage legitimate compliance 
allied to entrepreneurism because of the lack of an enforceable, independently verified 
CER standard against which an organisation’s performance and the accuracy of its 
reporting can be assessed.  Thus CER voluntarism by itself may be inadequate and 
legal controls may be required to enforce CER although this can itself be problematic.   
The core principles of CER are accountability; transparency and sustainability. 
But while corporations may publicly claim to be acting ethically and in a socially 
responsible manner, green criminology has documented the persistent nature of law-
breaking in respect of pollution, disposal of toxic waste and misuse of environmental 
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resources (Lynch & Stretesky, 2014; Pearce & Tombs, 1998). It has also challenged 
corporate definitions of good environmental practice and provided a means through 
which corporate wrong doing can frequently be considered as deliberate criminal acts 
(White & Heckenberg, 2014; Lynch and Stretesky, 2003).  In addition, Crowther and 
Aras (2008) argue that corporations do not truly account for the environmental impact 
of their activities so that externalities are routinely excluded from corporate 
accounting with the true costs of corporate environmental damage being met by 
communities.  Corporations may thus add ‘misleading the public’ or fraud to their 
environmental activities through poor or negligent corporate environmental reporting. 
Corporate directors already have a number of incentives to align their behaviour 
with accepted standards and routinely claim to be operating responsibly, taking 
account of the needs of communities.  Alcock and Conde (2005) argue that further 
legislation to regulate responsible corporate behaviour is unnecessary, but numerous 
cases highlight the failure of corporations to remedy the harm they have caused (see 
for example persistent pollution incidents at Shell’s Deer Park refinery 2003 to 2007 
discussed as a case study later in this chapter) suggesting the failure of self-regulation 
and voluntary compliance with ethical standards. Using perspectives on corporate 
governance; environmental law & regulatory justice this chapter’s contention is that 
corporate environmental damage should be the subject of regulatory restorative 
justice, in effect forcing corporations to comply with a set of CER principles and 
negating the harmful impacts of criminal entrepreneurship.  The ‘polluter pays’ 
principle should be a core feature of the law, enforcement and regulatory action to 
ensure that corporations take (private) responsibility for and remedy their 
environmental damage.  The following section defines how this principle is 
implemented in notions of CER.  
  
 
DEFINING CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE 
While a range of activities that cause harm to the environment are subject to 
national and international law, there is no single definition of environmental damage 
for which corporations should be held responsible.  In addition to the definitions 
contained within specific legislation, the social legal perspective argues that some 
acts, especially by corporations, ‘may not violate the criminal law yet are so violent in 
their expression or harmful in their effects to merit definition as crimes’ (Situ & 
Emmons, 2000:3).  In effect: 
 
The social legalist approach focuses on the construction of crime 
definitions by various segments of society and the political process by 
which some gain ascendancy, becoming embodied in the law.  The 
strict legalist approach, without denying this dynamic emphasizes these 
final legal definitions of crime as the starting point of any analysis 
because they bind the justice system in its work. 
(Situ & Emmons, 2000) 
 
While the environmental (and criminal) justice system focuses solely on those acts 
that are prohibited by legislation, definitions of environmental crime and corporate 
liability for these acts also needs to consider how criminal acts manifest themselves 
and consider those acts not yet defined as crimes but which go against the norms of 
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society.  Lynch and Stretesky explain that from an environmental justice perspective a 
green crime is an act that ‘(1) may or may not violate existing rules and environmental 
regulations; (2) has identifiable environmental damage outcomes; and (3) originated 
in human action’ (2003: 227). They explain that while some green ‘crimes’ may not 
contravene any existing law, where they result in or possess the potential for causing 
environmental and human harm, they should be considered to be crimes. In relation to 
CER; this requires a corporation to consider not just minimum legal standards but also 
the extent to which it may need to go beyond basic compliance and engage with 
communities and other stakeholders.  
White (2012) identifies that ‘much environmental harm is intrinsically 
transnational’ (2012: 15) and is by its very nature mobile and easily subject to 
transference.  He further argues that ‘the systemic causal chains that underpin much 
environmental harm are located at the level of the global political economy’ (White, 
2012: 15). Thus the global reach of MNEs is situated within international markets and 
systems of production, requiring a system of understanding and addressing 
environmental harm that incorporates appreciation of its international dimensions 
(Beirne & South, 2007).  However business activities are often not subject to 
international law or human rights norms designed to enforce environmental rights and 
thus there is some confusion over precisely what legal norms apply to a corporation’s 
activities and over the precise CER policies or standards they should observe. Harvard 
Professor John Ruggie (Special Representative to the UN Human Rights Council) 
identified that ‘the failure to enforce existing laws that directly or indirectly regulate 
business respect for human rights is often a significant legal gap in state practice’ 
(United Nations Human Rights Council, 2012: 8). Thus not only is judging 
appropriate standards of corporate behaviour problematic but so too is enforcing such 
standards and remedying environmental/human rights problems caused by 
corporations. Business activity that harms or impacts on the environmental rights of 
communities is subject to a mixture of voluntary compliance, regulatory activity and 
victim litigation primarily driven by national legislation.   
Mazurkiewicz (2002: 6) explained that by 2002 there had been ‘over 300 CSR 
codes, principles performance standards, management standards developed by 
governments, business associations, or academia’ and also a wide range of individual 
companies codes of conduct or different reporting mechanisms or initiatives. While 
international initiatives like the GRI have become widely recognised, the challenge 
for monitors, consumers and other stakeholders is to know the standard by which 
companies should be held to account, a problem complicated by the lack of an 
absolute CER standard agreed upon by NGOs and corporations, and by MNEs 
adopting and promoting different CER perspectives dependent upon the industry and 
legal/regulatory environment. Research by a network of Canadian environmental 
NGOS (ENGOs) concluded that ‘ENGOS view environmental commitment and 
awareness as key components of CER but expressed difficulty in discerning genuine 
environmental commitment from public relations exercises bordering on green wash’ 
(Jamison, Raynolds, Holroyd, Veldman & Tremblett, 2005: iv). Where CER is a 
fringe policy issue within a MNE it may amount to little more than a PR exercise. The 
ENGOs concluded, however, that the following key components were essential in 
achieving CER: 
 
1. Environmental commitment and awareness 
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2. Stakeholder engagement 
3. Measuring, reporting and auditing 
4. Transparency 
5. Commitment to continuous improvement 
6. Going beyond compliance 
 
However while corporations might easily put in place some form of measuring, 
reporting and auditing and include this in CSR, or CER policies, and annual reports; 
engagement with stakeholders and going beyond basic compliance presents 
difficulties for all but the most environmentally conscious corporations. Situ and 
Emmons (2000) argue that corporate environmental crime is ‘a product of motivation 
and opportunity conditioned by the quality of law enforcement’ (2000: 67). While this 
is not to suggest that all corporations are predisposed towards environmental crime; 
when the drive for corporate success (in terms of greater profits or lower costs) 
greatly exceeds the legitimate or profitable means for achieving it, the ‘structural 
groundwork for motivation is laid’ (2000: 67). Where this is combined with 
opportunity and a weak regulatory structure, corporations fearful of decreasing profits 
or increasing costs may seek to circumvent environmental legislation even while 
publicly making pronouncements of environmental responsibility. Where corporations 
may be dealing with multiple environmental performance demands and expectations 
from stakeholders and investors, the requirement to set protection and restoration of 
the environment as a strategic priority may result in a conflict between the interests of 
the corporation, environmental interests and those of the wider community. The 
Australian Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs (1989) 
summarised the potential conflict as follows: 
 
To require directors to take into account the interests of a company’s 
employees, its creditors, its customers or the environment, as well as its 
shareholders, would be to require them to balance out what would on occasion 
be conflicting forces. To make it optional for directors to take into account the 
interests of a company’s employees, its creditors, its customers, or the 
environment, as well as its shareholders, again would mean that directors 
would be in the position of weighing up the various factors. It would also limit 
the enforceability of shareholders’ rights if directors were able to argue that, in 
making a certain decision; they had been exercising their option to prefer other 
interests. 
(Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 1989). 
 
This potential conflict and a belief that corporate norms and the natural drive of 
corporations to behave ethically and responsibly will automatically provide for 
effective self-regulation, are at the heart of movements to resist further regulation of 
CSR and CER.  Yet while the concept of CSR is still evolving and, as yet, there exists 
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no globally-accepted binding definition of CSR (Kercher, 2007) there is evidence that 
even corporations that actively promote themselves as engaging with communities 
and being ethically responsible still cause significant harms to the environment. 
Seemingly, self-regulation and voluntary compliance with the norms of corporate 
behaviour and ethical business practices is not working.  The following section 
examines the implications of relying on self-regulation to maintain compliance.    
 
FAILURES IN VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE 
Situ and Emmons (2000) identify that environmental crime is predominantly a civil 
matter; in other words fines and administrative penalties are the main technique for 
dealing with corporate environmental crime rather than rigorous criminal justice 
enforcement (White & Heckenberg, 2014; Stallworthy, 2008). The reason given for 
this is the lack of effective international law and instead reliance on state (national) 
legislators to define environmental crime according to the requirements of national 
criminal or civil justice codes.  The result is often that it is not seen as a priority 
criminal justice issue and often falls outside of the remit of the main criminal justice 
agencies. 
 However, there are a number of international environmental Conventions, 
mechanisms put in place to require states to provide for effective environmental 
protection.  Voiculescu and Yanacopulos (2011) identify the United Nations (UN) as 
being at the forefront of devising universally acceptable standards to embed ‘respect 
for human rights norms and abstention from corrupt practices’ into business and 
transnational corporations’ operating practices (2011: 4).  Their observation is based 
on the idea that much environmental damage is committed by corporations falling 
outside the remit of much criminal law as in reality countries have different laws and 
‘frequently quite different approaches to dealing with environmental crime’ (White, 
2007: 184). Environmental crime is also not always dealt with by police or criminal 
justice agencies and in many countries falls within the jurisdiction of the enforcement 
arm of the state environment department, rather than being integrated into mainstream 
criminal justice. Indeed some jurisdictions do not provide for corporate criminal 
liability within their justice systems.  As a result, CER becomes a matter of voluntary 
compliance and in practice is often enforced primarily by NGOs (Nurse, 2013; 2011). 
Yet voluntary compliance with good standards of CSR and CER is often dependent 
on; the composition of a corporation’s board, the extent to which it is willing to 
comply with good standards, and the size and power of that corporation.  
Friedman theorised that the main responsibility of the corporate executive is ‘to 
make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic rules of the society’ 
(Friedman, 1970).  Crowhurst (2006) identified that while responsible industry 
usually welcomes certainty in environmental legislation and clarity in CER there are 
corporations that actively seek to avoid ‘costly’ legislation.  Global corporations 
which produce harmful environmental effects and who have the economic power to 
do so deliberately, invest in ‘pollution havens’ (countries with low levels of 
environmental regulation) so that as standards of environmental liability become 
stricter in the EU and other western countries global companies move their 
investments and harmful environmental activities out of the reach of the tougher 
regulatory systems.2   This represents a form of criminal entrepreneurship. 
                                               
2
 ‘Balancing the Needs of Business with those of the Human Race’ (2001) 20 IFL Rev, Supp 
(Environment lawyers), 7-15. Comment by panel member John Emmerig, Blake Dawson Waldron, 
Canberra responding to the question ‘Environmental legislation is increasing in all jurisdictions. What 
effect is this having on trade and industry around the world?’ 
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GREENWASH AND CRIMINAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
Gottschalk and Smith argue that the criminal entrepreneur’s task is ‘to discover and 
exploit opportunities, defined most simply as situations in which there are a profit to 
be made in criminal activity’ (2011: 300).  In the case of environmental harm, this is 
illustrated by situations where multinational corporations pursue profit without regard 
to relevant CSR/CER matters (Kercher, 2007) and, when caught in environmental 
wrongdoing, dispute the extent of the environmental damage they cause or the 
measures required to resolve the damage.  Gottschalk and Smith argue that techniques 
of neutralization are applied by white-collar criminals to deny the criminality of their 
actions and that criminal entrepreneurship is sometimes embedded in the behaviour of 
legal organisations who become the victims of such third party actions committed by 
employers and managers which cause loss to the corporation (2011: 304).  However, 
they also note that corporations become perpetrators of crime when [financial] crime 
is committed within the context of a legal organization. 
This applies equally to environmental crime where ‘Green wash’ is employed as a 
tool to publicly promote CER while a corporation privately continues to pollute and 
subvert environmental regulations as a tactic.  Friedman (1970) argues that corporate 
executives have direct responsibilities to their employers and to maximise profits. 
These responsibilities require executives to consider: the harm to a company’s 
reputation (and profits) if it is repeatedly the subject of enforcement action and 
required to meet the costs of environmental remediation, the increased legal bills that 
a corporation may face in fighting lawsuits; consumer action and regulatory justice, 
and the increased likelihood of further regulation and scrutiny if corporations are 
found to be promoting CER while causing environmental damage.  
McBarnet suggests a tension between conflicting responsibilities such that 
creative compliance becomes ‘something to be emulated rather than reviled’ (2006:  
1092) and is considered clever rather than deviant.  McBarnet primarily refers to 
‘clever and imaginative legal problem solving’ (2006: 1096) and the use of legal 
mechanisms to make potentially unlawful mechanisms and practices lawful.  However 
corporate practices that embed environmental compliance within policies that can be 
referred to in the event of regulatory investigations but which in practice may not be 
effective also represent a form of creative compliance.  Gallicano refers to active 
‘greenwashing’ where individuals are actively misled about a company’s 
environmental practices (2011: 1).  In a broader sense, inconsistency between a 
company’s environmental claims and its actual behaviour also represents a form of 
‘greenwashing’ as the following case study illustrates.   
 
INEFFECTIVE JUSTICE: SHELL AND THE DEER PARK REFINERY  
As Situ and Emmons (2000) identify, weak environmental law enforcement allows 
corporate environmental crime particularly within competitive markets where the 
benefits of non-compliance may significantly outweigh the limited risk of detection 
and apprehension. This is not to suggest that all corporations are predisposed towards 
environmental crime and strictly speaking much environmental harm is regulatory 
non-compliance rather than crime.  However, Heckenberg (2010) identifies that 
global environmental harm is part of a complex process of transference which can be 
‘externalised from producers and consumers in ways that make it disappear from their 




sight and oversight’ (White, 2012: 21). Movement of environmentally damaging 
products within global markets becomes difficult to police, especially given disputes 
over what is defined as environmentally harmful and what gets defined as a crime 
(White, 2012: 22). Thus, corporations seeking to maximise profits and minimise costs 
within lucrative global markets subject to ineffective laws and weak regulatory 
structures may seek to circumvent environmental legislation even while publicly 
making pronouncements of environmental responsibility.   
Deer Park, Texas, is home to a Shell chemical plant, one of the largest oil 
refineries in the US and which has been the subject of numerous environmental 
violations primarily of the (US) Clean Air Act 1970.  For example, in June 1997 an 
ethylene explosion at the plant was heard and felt up to 25 miles away.  In 2008 
environmental organisation the Sierra Club filed a federal lawsuit against the Shell Oil 
Company and its subsidiaries over an estimated 1,000 incidents of pollution between 
2003 and 2007 at Shell’s Deer Park refinery and chemical plant.  The pollution levels 
at the plant exceeded the levels allowed under permits issued by Texas regulators, 
amounting to a total of five million pounds of air pollutants into the atmosphere, 
‘including toxic chemicals like benzene and 1,3-butadiene, as well as sulfur dioxide 
and oxides of nitrogen’ (Mouawad, 2009). Although Shell had been cited by 
regulators and had paid fines for some of the incidents, its failure to take any action 
over the pollution at the plant led to the Sierra Club and Environment Texas initiating 
the lawsuit to force enforcement of the Clean Air Act’s provisions.  Joshua Kratka of 
the National Environment Law Center (representing the Sierra Club and Environment 
Texas) stated that Shell was paying to pollute alleging that ‘Shell is factoring these 
fines into its costs of operating these facilities’ (Seba, 2008).   
Yet publicly Shell had embedded sustainability and environmental best practice 
into its operating procedures since 1997.  The company states that all of its operations 
‘must take a systematic approach to managing environmental impacts’ (2008: 21).  
The company further states that ‘Shell’s groundbreaking first sustainability 
report Profit and Principles – does there have to be a choice? issued in 1998 after 
Shell’s reputation and internal morale had suffered as a result of Brent Spar and 
human rights issues in Nigeria’ set the benchmark for scrutiny of the company’s 
practices (SustainAbility, 2010).  Thus, at the time of the problems at Deer Park, Shell 
had already instituted a CSR process with external scrutiny of sustainability issues 
and annual reporting.  Since 2005 its sustainability reporting has been subject to the 
scrutiny of a Committee of external experts and the company states it followed the 
Global Reporting Initiative’s guidelines.  An External Review Committee assesses 
Shell’s sustainability reporting content and processes; details of Committee 
Membership and reports are openly published by Shell online.  For example the 2011 
Committee includes experts from; the Indigenous Peoples Working Group of the 
Social Investment Forum, a barrister working with the International Finance 
Corporation, an Environmental Policy Advisor to Rio Tinto plc (who is also a Visiting 
Professor at Imperial and University Colleges, London), and the co-founder and CEO 
of policy think tank Civic Exchange.  The Committee thus arguably boasts 
considerable expertise independent of Shell’s corporate structure; its 2011 report 
indicates Shell’s engagement with sustainability issues but is also mildly critical of 
Shell’s failure to achieve long term sustainability action.   
While it is not suggested that Shell was in any way influencing Committee 
decisions an overly critical Committee risks its own survival and external advisors 
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may well be diplomatic in the manner in which criticisms are couched. Other 
corporations use external auditors for their sustainability review (BP for example uses 
Ernst and Young). Shell’s 2008 report, comments that ‘we have a structured 
company-wide approach for listening to our neighbours, for working with them to 
reduce negative impacts from our operations and produce local benefits’ (Shell, 2009:  
26).  It further comments that ‘all our refineries and chemicals facilities, as well as all 
upstream operations where impacts on the community could be high, have social 
performance plans in place’ Shell, 2009: 26). The reporting further notes that Shell 
has instigated a ‘multi-billion dollar programme to end the continuous venting and 
flaring of natural gas at oil production facilities’ (Shell 2009: 29) and noted 
improvements in energy efficiency at Shell chemical plants since 2001.  Yet in the 
case of Deer Park the concerns and impact on residents were seemingly not directly 
being addressed either through the regulatory mechanism or the company’s own 
monitoring process. 
Connelly and Smith (1999) suggest that collective action is often the necessary 
solution to environmental problems where civil action can be used to seek a remedy in 
ways that criminal action often fails to. The failures in formal (state) enforcement 
action in Texas required citizen groups to sue to stop illegal air emissions arising from 
so-called ‘upset’ events: equipment breakdowns, malfunctions, and other non-routine 
occurrences. Luke Metzger, Director of Environment Texas explained that ‘despite 
repeat violation notices and fines, the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality 
never got to the root of the problems at Shell Deer Park’ (Environment Texas/Sierra 
Club, 2009). The lawsuit was subject to a settlement agreement in April 2009 
requiring Shell to remedy the faulty processes at the plant which were causing 
pollution problems and to pay a civil penalty which would be used for further 
environmental measures (see below).  Arguably it illustrates a means through which 
the impacts of creative compliance and corporate non-compliance can be addressed by 
justice systems, as the following section discusses.  
 
REPARATION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE 
Combating those practices which may view the continued payment of fines as 
preferable to the costs of remediation or organisational change requires a change in 
regulatory approach.  The use of the ‘polluter pays’ principle for environmental 
damage was adopted by the OECD in 1972 as a background economic principle for 
environmental policy (Turner, 1992).  By making goods and services reflect their total 
cost, including the cost of all the resources used, the principle required polluters to 
integrate (or internalise) the cost of use or degradation of environmental resources. 
However, environmental damage is not solely an issue of cost and increasingly 
legislators, regulators and the courts apply the basic principles of restorative justice 
which include the ‘repair of harm’ principle and mediation or contact between victim 
and offender as tools to remedy or mitigate corporate environmental damage. 
Parker (2004) identifies a model where regulators are able to directly address 
creative non-compliance by imposing enforceable undertakings which provide 
regulators to employ their own creativity in recommending remedies for harm caused 
by corporate wrongdoing.  The ideal for such effective restorative justice is that 
offenders are held to account for what they have done, realise the harm that they have 
caused and are encouraged to both remedy that harm and change behaviour.  
Successful restorative justice also avoids the escalation of legal justice and its 
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associated costs and delays (Marshall, 1999). Applied to environmental damage 
restorative justice provides for legal enforcement of CER and moves beyond the 
general criminal law approach of punishment to embrace civil law’s focus on 
remedying injustice such as environmental harm.  It potentially provides for targeted 
enforcement action that negates the creative non compliance of criminal 
entrepreneurialism.  
      The settlement negotiated by Shell in relation to the Deer Park pollution provides 
a model for negotiated settlements using restorative principles. The settlement 
requires Shell to; reduce emissions from air pollutants from its plant by 80 percent 
within three years, upgrade chemical units and reduce gas flaring, and is also 
accompanied by a $5.8 million civil penalty.  The settlement agreement between Shell 
and the environmental groups was subject to review by regulators (the EPA and the 
Justice Department) and also required the approval of the US District Court for the 
Southern District of Texas providing a measure of judicial oversight of the settlement. 
While it is impossible to achieve the ideal of putting the community back in the 
position it would have been in had the harm not occurred, the penalty will ‘be used to 
finance environmental, public health and education projects in Harris County 
including a project to reduce diesel emissions from school buses, and another to 
install solar panels on public buildings’ (Mouawad, 2009).  Thus Shell’s damage to 
the environment at Deer Park is at least partially offset by positive environmental 
action.   
 
ENFORCING CER 
Corporations who break environmental laws and fall short of accepted standards of 
behaviour are not always prosecuted via the criminal law but are sometimes subject 
only to civil or administrative sanctions.  Strong environmental legislation, regulation 
and environmental awareness is often driven by the activities of high profile NGOs 
who work to ensure that prosecution of companies for environmental damage 
becomes an established part of the legal landscape (Nurse, 2013). The legal 
responsibility of MNEs for injury to workers and environmental damage arising from 
their operations is increasingly exercising the interest of courts, governments, trades 
unions and NGOs globally and is beginning to be recognised by both civil and 
criminal justice systems, offering hope that an efficient mechanism for enforcing CER 
can be established.   
However Slapper (2011) identifies that there have been modest developments in 
the use of the civil law to address corporate abuses (2011: 95) and that ‘apart from a 
growth in domestic criminal liability of corporations’ there has been an increase both 
in civil litigation against companies ‘but also the advent of domestic liability for 
corporate torts that are committed abroad’ (2011: 95). Thus, while international law 
may not yet have caught up with transnational corporate environmental abuses, 
domestic law might, in some cases, provide a civil remedy.   
Slapper’s point is illustrated by US civil law in the form of the Alien Tort Claims 
Act 1789 which allows action to be taken against companies for their actions overseas 
(Slapper, 2011: 95).  The Act confers on US federal courts jurisdiction over ‘any civil 
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a 
treaty of the United States’.  Thus where corporate acts which are the subject of 
litigation raise international concerns and constitute a crime against humanity, a 
remedy potentially exists for victims of corporate abuses able to bring a case in US 
courts.  Cases can also be brought in the EU against a parent company resident in the 
EU where it can be shown that the relevant management decisions (i.e. those which 
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influenced or caused the local incident) were made at parent company level.  Fagan 
and Thompson identify class actions as being the primary legal mechanism feared by 
US corporations, which Hodges (2008) identifies as being based on a model where 
‘one individual claim is asserted to represent a class of others, whose owners are 
bound by the result of the single claim unless they opt-out of the class and procedure’ 
(2008: 2). The class action procedure allows for punitive damages and requires parties 
to meet their own costs (Fagan & Thompson 2009: 56-57). 
The existence of CER policies can also be a factor in litigation.  The International 
Council for Human Rights Policy notes that many company CSR codes are little more 
than public relations exercises.  But, where worded with sufficiently clarity ‘they can 
also have legal significance because they set out the values, ethical standards, and 
expectations of the company concerned, and might be used as evidence in legal 
proceedings with suppliers, employees or consumers’ (2002: 70). Fagan and 
Thompson (2009: 55) identify that litigation has already been brought against 
companies such as Wall-Mart and Nike for publishing allegedly misleading CSR 
materials.  Nike was the subject of litigation after having allegedly lied in PR 
materials about the mistreatment of workers in its supply chain, while Wal-Mart was 
sued for a failure to enforce its supplier standards.  Thus while international human 
rights norms or international environmental law might be difficult to enforce against 
companies, CSR materials can, in the US at least, be used as evidence of the standards 
that a corporation claims to meet.  Fagan and Thompson argue that consumers might 
be able to bring misrepresentation claims against corporations if they can demonstrate 
that they have suffered recoverable loss as a result of the claims made (2009: 55). The 
threat of such litigation might encourage a change in corporate behaviour and when 
combined with criminal action such as that employed in the US Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (and also within UK legislation) of providing incentives for corporations 
to work with enforcers in order to avoid criminal prosecution and to settle cases 
through civil mechanisms (Hatchard 2011: 153-155) can provide a remedy.  
Simpson et al. (2013) identify that informal controls are an important part of the 
regulatory environment while Hatchard argues that the threat of prosecution allied to 
self-reporting may prove effective in dealing with transnational corporate crime 
(2011: 153).  The UK’s Law Commission in its consultation paper on wildlife law 
reform (Law Commission, 2012) argues that any regulatory approach should adopt 
the risk-based approach of the Hampton (2005) and McCrory (2006) principles.  In 
essence these argue that prosecution should only be resorted to where necessary and, 
in the case of corporate offending, should be a last resort where informal methods 
might yield results.  The practical implementation of such mechanisms can be seen in 
cases such as the Serious Fraud Office’s initiative to allow corporations to self-report 
corruption and negotiate a civil settlement as a means of avoiding prosecution 
(Hatchard 2011: 155). The effectiveness of such initiatives in part depends on whether 
the harm caused to corporations by any prosecution outweighs the financial benefits 
of non-compliance with environmental standards.  Arguably where criminality is an 
endemic part of corporate behaviour (Nurse, 2011) self-reporting or negotiated 
settlements are unlikely to succeed.   
 
CONCLUSIONS 
While corporations may achieve voluntary compliance with CER and have 
appropriate CER polices at least on paper, it is essential that the application of CSR 
and CER principles are part of the legal and regulatory justice system. This is 
preferable to that system being applied only after environmental harms have occurred 
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and disputes arise over corporate liability and appropriate remedies. Failures in 
voluntary compliance are inevitable where there are disputes between NGOs, 
corporations and communities over the responsibilities of corporations and the extent 
of stakeholder engagement. Where commercial imperatives override wider 
environmental responsibilities and are also associated with weak enforcement and 
regulatory regimes crime is more likely to occur.  Given the lack of an enforceable 
standard for CER compliance, corporations and NGOs may disagree over what is 
required either to minimise the potential harm to the environment arising from 
corporate activities or to address harm to the environment once an incident has 
occurred.  There are, therefore, undoubtedly some cases (or types of environmental 
damage) for which negotiation between communities and corporations, or 
corporations and NGOs is inappropriate and where self-regulation and voluntary CER 
policy-compliance fails.  In these cases enforcers should be able to enforce CER 
through the imposition of remedial measures, reserving the right to move to formal 
prosecution action even though this may not provide full redress for the consumer.  
Legislation needs to keep pace with persistent CER failures, corporate criminality 
and creative criminal entrepreneurship; EU (and UK) legislation provides one means 
through which this can be achieved using restorative justice principles within the 
environmental law regime.  The UK’s Environmental Damage (Prevention and 
Remediation) Regulations 2009 allows UK enforcers (generally the Environment 
Agency, the relevant local authority or Natural England) to require corporations to 
remedy their environmental harm.  In addition the UKs Regulatory Enforcement and 
Sanctions Act 2008 allows for restorative principles to be applied to some cases of 
damage to the environment (including under the Control of Pollution Act 1974, the 
Clean Air Act 1993, the Environment Act 1995, Water Industry Act 1991 and Water 
Resources Act 1991) through the use of enforcement mechanisms that are designed to 
repair the harm caused by business practices (particularly through discretionary 
restorative notices and enforcement undertakings) rather than simply punishing 
offenders.   
As Slapper (2011) indicates, US law now also provides a model that might be 
applied to enforcement of failed CER where CER compliance claims are found to be 
untrue or exaggerated and have the effect of misleading consumers.  Such claims will 
primarily be the subject of civil action and it should be noted that the use of class 
actions is commonplace in the US but less so in the EU.  But at least in theory, 
legislative and regulatory frameworks now exist that have not only moved firmly 
towards the ‘polluter pays principle’ but which also allow for the actions of MNEs to 
be measured against their CER promises and an implied standard of behaviour. Thus 
those that are responsible for environmental damage may not only be subject to 
criminal enforcement activity and/or civil litigation but open themselves up to judicial 
scrutiny of their corporate governance procedures through legal processes. This falls 
short of achieving a global legal enforceable standard for CER.  However the 
availability of several routes through which CER failures can be enforced may not 
only make the polluter pay, but may also make the polluter stop and think before 
making unfounded claims of environmental responsibility while engaging in creative 
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